Lebanon’s fragile sectarian balance has been a persistent challenge to the country’s stability. The assassination of Rafic Hariri nearly two decades ago was a pivotal turning point in Lebanese politics. The Cedar Revolution, a mass protest movement primarily driven by Christians and Sunnis, eventually led to the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005. However, this withdrawal exposed deep-seated sectarian tensions that had long been simmering beneath the surface.
Hezbollah and Amal, a powerful Shiite political bloc, organized counterdemonstrations, rallying the Shiite population against the anti-Syrian movement. Many Shiites perceived the Cedar Revolution as an effort by Sunnis and Christians to curb their rising influence. The brief moment of national unity following Syria’s withdrawal soon gave way to polarization, as Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement capitalized on Christian disillusionment.
Aoun’s rapid rise unsettled traditional Christian leaders, who saw their influence wane in the face of Aoun’s populism. In response, these leaders formed the March 14 coalition alongside the Future Movement, effectively sidelining the FPM. This polarization deepened Lebanon’s sectarian divides, with Sunnis largely rallying behind the Hariri-led Future Movement, while Shiites aligned with Hezbollah and Amal. Christians remained split, reflecting their growing anxieties over declining political and demographic power.
The division within the Christian political sphere deepened when Aoun forged an alliance with Hezbollah in 2006. This move fundamentally reshaped Lebanon’s political landscape, polarizing the country into two distinct blocs: the March 14 coalition, backed by Sunnis, Maronites, and Druze, and the March 8 coalition, led by Hezbollah, Amal, and Aoun’s FPM. These sectarian alliances reflected competing visions for Lebanon’s future, with March 14 advocating closer ties with the West and Gulf states, and March 8 promoting a “Resistance” axis aligned with Iran and Syria.
Aoun’s alliance with Hezbollah was framed by both sides as a strategic necessity to safeguard Christian influence in the face of rising Shiite power. However, this partnership came at a cost for Aoun and the Christians, as Hezbollah leveraged its control over the state to marginalize Christian influence. The 2008 Doha Accords, which ended an 18-month political crisis, solidified Hezbollah’s dominance over the state, despite promises of Christian electoral reforms.
Hezbollah’s marginalization of Christians was not solely achieved through overt political maneuvers. It also relied on more subtle tactics, such as electoral manipulation, which weakened Christian voting power and reinforced Hezbollah’s control over Lebanon’s political landscape. The group’s influence over illicit trade, particularly narcotics smuggling, has created a parallel economy that circumvents traditional Sunni economic strongholds, further weakening Sunni political actors.
Hezbollah’s extensive social services network in regions traditionally controlled by Sunnis or Christians has eroded the influence of Sunni and Christian political elites, who have struggled to offer comparable support to their constituencies. Coupled with Hezbollah’s control over key ministries like Health and Public Works, this has made the group indispensable to large segments of the population, regardless of sectarian identity.
The theological-legal doctrine of “Wilayat al-Faqih,” or Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, which guides Hezbollah, ensures that clerical authority remains supreme, making meaningful democratization nearly impossible. This doctrine has marginalized both Christian and Sunni political actors, rendering their roles largely ceremonial.
Traditionally dominated by Sunnis, the Lebanese Armed Forces and Internal Security Forces have seen key positions filled by Hezbollah-aligned Shiite loyalists. Sunni militias that once played a pivotal role in Lebanese politics have either been disbanded or co-opted by Hezbollah, while Sunni political parties remain fractured. Al-Murabitun, a key player during the civil war, was disbanded under the Taif Agreement, leaving the Sunni community without military leverage.
Hezbollah has skillfully exploited Sunni fragmentation by forming pragmatic alliances with smaller Sunni factions. In regions like Sidon and Tripoli, Hezbollah supports marginal Sunni leaders to undermine more prominent Sunni political figures and sow local divisions. These local alliances ensure that no single Sunni political movement can effectively challenge Hezbollah’s dominance within Lebanon’s sectarian system.
The rise of Salafist and jihadist groups in Sunni areas, exacerbated by the spillover of the Syrian civil war, further weakened the moderate Sunni leadership, creating a vacuum that Hezbollah has been quick to exploit. By promoting a narrative of “takfir,” or apostasy, Hezbollah has sought to delegitimize Sunni political actors who oppose its agenda, framing them as extremists or traitors to the Lebanese state.
Under Hezbollah’s influence, Lebanon’s political system has grown increasingly authoritarian, with key state institutions falling under clerical control. Its political machinations have worked to ensure that key allies like the Christian FPM and Frangieh’s Marada Movement remain beholden to its agenda. This shift has made it impossible for the Christian and Sunni communities to challenge Hezbollah’s dominance, obstructing any chance for political reform.
By embedding itself in Lebanon’s institutions and exploiting sectarianism, Hezbollah has paralyzed the country’s future and directly threatened U.S. interests in the Middle East.
